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I NT T R 0 D U C T 0 N.
There is perhaps no principle in law,upon which the courts
are more uniformly agreed than that of res gestae. Yet the
application of the principle is so varied,and the decisions
so conflicting,that an attempt to reconcile them seems,in
many cases hopeless.
If we determine how the phrase originated trace
its history,and the various meanings of which it is suscepti-
ble;we shall be able to understand more clearly the conplel
manner with which the courts have dealt with it ,and possibly
deduce common principles which will be of future value,in re-
storing order to the present uncertain condition of the rules
of evidence relating to our subject.
Origin and Development.
This phrase,in one form or another,res gesta,res actares gos-
tae,was familiar in classical Latin literature,as one may see
by reference to any Latin dictionary. The phrase res acta is
most often found now in our law in the phrase res acta inter
alios;thou71h the terms were once used interchangably to a cer-
tain extent.(3 Dane's Abridgement,530 (1823)). The first in-
stance discovered of the use of the term in English law occur-
red in Home Tookes trial for high treason.( 25 Iowells State
Trials,444 (1794). In which the counsel for the government,in
commenting during a legal discussion as to the propriety of
the examination of a witness by Erskine,for the defence,as to
the reasons why a certain proposal made by one society was not
accepted by the other. A letter stating the reasons for de-
clining the propositions had been received in evidence. Garrow
for the government objected to the stating of the reason on
the ground that Tooke was not a member of the society,and the
letter must speak for itself: "That letter your lordships have
received ......... probably upon the ground,that as it is an
answer to an act which is charged against the prisoner,it is
fit to be received as part of the res gesta upon the subject".
The expression is not used again until 1801,although in ( R
v.1-ardy 24 Howells State Trials,199 at page 453.) Lord Chief
Justice Eyre says: "In the cases of Damaree and Lord George
Gordon the cry of the mob at the time made a part of the
fact,of the transaction." This is the thing itself which in
later days we style the res gesta. The phrase is next found in
Hoare v.Allen 3 Esp.276 (1801) where Lord Kenyon lets certain
evidence in over objection,on the ground that some of the
judges on a motion for a new trial,had thought it part of the
res gesta. It is first used in the plural form which is now
so universal,in Avison v.Lord Kinnaid,6 East 188,(1805) where
the counsel often and the court once speak of the res gestae.
The first trace found of it in this country was in Mass.in
the case of Bartlett v.Delprat,4 1ass.702 (1808) when Mr Story
in arguing for the plaintiff,against the admission of certain
declarations,gives the classes of cases in which declarations
are admissibleand gives one class to be those, "declarations
forming part of the res gestae,"citing the case of Avison v.
Kinnaid. The court however does not use the expression in this
case.
Time will not permit as caref,.d an historical examination of
the term as might be wished. Enough has been said however to
show that the phrase was fairly recognized in the law of evi-
dence at the beginning of the century. There are however signs
that it was not always regarded with Vavur. In the first edi-
tion of Phillips on evidence published in 1814,he said:
4.
"Hearsay is often admitted in evidence as part of the res ges-
ta; the meaning of which seems to be that where it is neces-
sary .......... to inquire into the nature of a particular act,
and the intention of the person who did the act,proof of what
the person said at the time of doing it is adnissible evi-
dence for the purpose of showing its nature and character."
He struck this phrase out of his fourth edition,(1819) substi-
tuting the english word "transaction, " this he continued to
use until associated with Ilr.Amos he published his eight edi-
tion,in 1838,in that edition he placed the Latin term in the
plural formres gestae,and it has remained there since.
Starkie published his work in 1824,and has always used the
phrase res gestae,as have Greenleaf,Taylor,and Wharton;while
Stephens dispenses with it entirely in his digest of evidence.
Having examined briefly into the origin of the phrase it
would be interesting as well as profitable to know just what
called it into use. This seems to be more a matter of specula-
tion than positive knowledge. One writer accounts for its
origin on account of its "convenient obscurity. " At the end
of the last century there was an attempt to unify the rules of
evidence instead of leaving them as questions of usage for the
various localities where they might arise. This was assisted
by reporting cases at nisi prius,made as the compiler of one
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tells us in his preface,to preserve the rulings in points of
evidence,-formerly only to be learned "by close and constant
attendance at nisi prius." The law of hearsay evidence being
at that time unsettled the lawyers seem to have caught at the
term res gestae. This phrase seemed thereafter to serve for
the same thing which heretofore had been expressed by the
term,-"the transaction," "the fact." They did not stop to an-
alyze closely the application of the term. Somethings were evi-
dently placed under this head because of the convenience it
afforded in getting around a difficult question. The plural
phrase soon transplanted the singular. The more indefinite
they made it the more easy it became to enlarge and unsettle
its scope.
This seems to be the most satisfactory explanation of
its origin which has been found. That this was a dangerous ex-
pedient lawyers of the present day have ample proof by the
ever increasing vagueness and uncertainty of the expression.
To show the "convenient obscurity of the phrase it may not be
amiss to quote some of the meanings which have been applied
to the phrase. Prof.Thayer gives the following as some of the
meanings which most readily suggest themselves. In the common
plural form it may mean either: "(a) a conception which limits
the term res gestae to the ultimate facts in the case,-to a
fact in issue; (b) one which extends it to any evidentiary fact:
and then using the term in either of these two ways. l.That
of a single fact,an event,a transaction,of which a declaration
may be a part,-pars rei gestaeas the phrase sometimes is;2.
That of the details which go to constitute this single whole;
3.That of several distinct facts,eventstransactions,going to
make up a larger composite whole,e.g.,the notion of the par-
ticulars of a business or a piece of business intrusted to an
agent or a series of connected transactions covered by a con-
sriracy; 4. That of the one composite whole so made up; 5.That
of evidentiary or illustrative facts of concomitant circum-
stances,or "surrounding circumstances" as distinguished from
the central fact thus surrounded or attended; 6. That of a
total whole embodying the central fact with its entire bulk of
circumstances; 7.That of a central fact and some of its sur-
roundings,e.g.,such of them as are relevant or material to the
given inquiry."
Modern Application.
The courts now generally agree in their application of the
doctrine that res gestae denotes the "transaction" constitu-
ting the fact in issue,or deemed relevant theryeto,-the "act to
be proved, I'- "the fact in question, "-"those surrounding circum-
stances which relate to and illustrate the principle fact and
its necessary or usual incidents "-and sometimes other phrases
or terms are used in defining it. Prof. Chase says: "Declara-
tions (or acts) forming part of such "transaction"are deemed
competent evidence,because they serve to illustrate its charac-
.ter,show the motive which occasioned itexhibit its nature,ob-
ject or purpose,explain its origin or signifigance,show the
relations of the parties concerned therein etc." In the case
of Beaver v.Taylor 1 Wall.at p, 642. Mr Justice Swayne says:
"It is,perhaps not posirble to lay down any general rule as to
what is part of the res gestae which will be decisive in every
case in which it may be presented by the varying phrases of
human affairs. The judicial mind will always be compelled fre-
quently to apply the general principle and deduce the proper
conclusion." Perhaps the most common and largest class of
cases in which declarations are admissible,is that in which
the state of mired or motive with which any particular act is
done is the subject of inquiry. Thus the mere assembling of a
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mob does not disclose their purpose,but the cries of the mob
made their intention plain and upon such evidence treason
could be proved. (Lord George Gordons case,2, Howells State
Trials 520). But if the declarations are made subsequent and
are merely narrative of the previous occurrence they are lia-
ble to be influenced by subsequent occurrences. They depend
for their reliability wholly upon the memory and reliability
of the witness. (Waldele v.N.Y.C.& H.R.R.CO.,95 N.Y.274.) Upon
an indictment for abortion the woman upon whom the abortion
was attempted being dead,the prosecution proved that she went
away in a buggy,returned in the night,and told a witness what
had been done and said to her by the doctor who performed the
operation upon the alleged procurement of the defendant.This
evidence being objected to on the part of the defendant. The
Court of Appeals,Grover J.writing the opinion said: "In this
case the thing done or "es gestae,was the doctors office at
another townand it is clear that its narration by the deceas-
ed was no part of the thing. Anything said accompanying the
performance of an act,explanatory thereof,or showing its pur-
pose or intention when material is competent as part of the
act. But when the declarations offered are merely narrations
of past occurrences they are incompetent. This is precisely
this case. The declarations given in evidence were a mere
staternnt of what had been done at the doctors office,and not
any part of what was then done,and therefore not part of the
res gestae." And the court further said: "The length of time
between the act and its subsequent narration by one of the
actors I do not regard as material. The question is ,did the
proposed declaration accompany the act,or was it so connected
therewith as to constitute a part of it? If so it is a part of
the res gestae and competentotherwise not." (People v.Davis,
50 N.Y.95.) "The declaration of a person who is wounded and
bleeding,that the defendant has stabbed her,made immediately
after the occurrence,though with such an interval of time as
to allow her to go from her own room up stairs into another
room is admissible in evidence after her death as part of the
res gestae."(Peo.v.McPike,3 Cush.181). This is a very extreme
case,no authorities being cited to support it. The opinion of
the court seems to rest on the closing sentence which is as
follows: "In testimony of this character,much must be left to
the exercise of the sound discretion of the presiding judge."
Later decisions change this broad position materialy,leaving
less to the discretion of the court. In(Lund v.Tyngsborough,
9 Cush. 36.) the court said: "When the act of a party may be giv-
en in evidence,his declarations made at the time,and calcula-
ted to elucidate and explain the character and quality of the
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act,and so connected with it as to constitute one transaction,
and so as to derive credit from the acts itself,are admissi-
ble in evidence. The credit which the act or fact gives to th
accompanying declarations as a part of the transaction to
explain the particular fact uistinguish this class of declara-
tions from mere hearsay; "and further: "Such a declaration de-
rives credit and importance as forming a part of the transact-
ion itself,and is included in the surrounding circumstances
which may always be given in evidence to the jury with the prin
ciple fact. There must be a main or principle fact or trans-
action and only such declarations are admissible as grow out
of the principle transaction,illustrate its character,are con-
tempoary with itand derive some degree of #rbdit from it."
In ( Com.v. Backett,2 Allen 136.) a witness testified that,at
the moment the fatal stabs were given,he he-ard the victim cry
out; "I ar stabbed, "and he at once went to him and reached him
within twenty seconds after that,and then heard him say;I am
stabbed,-I am gone-Dan Hackett stabbed me." This evidence was
held admissible. The court characterizing it as,"an explana-
tion or statement contempoary with,the same transaction,form-
ing a material and natural part of it,and competent as being
original evidence in the nature of res gestae." and in (Wald-
ele v.R.R.CO. supra) the last two cases are favorably comment-
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ed upon and adopted as the rule by the court. The court said
in (Brownell v.Pacific R.R. Co.,47 M0.239.) "The next question
is in relation to the admission of the declaration of Brovm-
ell. The accidnet happened in consequence of a switch being
left open on the defendants track. There is no dispute or con-
troversey about the fact that the switch was left open. Immved-
iately after the accidentwhen Brownell was restored to consi-
cousness,and just before he died,he said:.... "If it had not
been for the man who left the switch open, "This was objected
to,but the objection was overruled and the testimony admitted.
As a dying declaration it was clearly inad.issible,for the
modern decisions Clearly establish the doctrine that the rule
permitting dying declarations to be given in evidence applies
exclusively to criminal prosecutions for felonious homicides,
and has no reference to civil cases. But every declaration of
a deceased person is not rejected on this principle. Where a
declaration is made by a deceased person,contemporaneously or
nearly so,with a main event,by whose consequence it is alleged
he &ied,as to the cause of that event,thougl ,eneraly the dec-
larations must be contemporaneous with the event,yet where
there are any connecting circumstances they may,even when mrad
sometime afterwards form a part of the whole res gestae. The
declaration of Brownell,in reference to the switchgrew direct-
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ly out of and was made directly after the happening of the
fact. 1o one would hesitate to act on such evidence in his
own concerns. It was so intimately connected that it made a
part of the transaction itself,and I think clearly came within
the doctrine of res gestae."
Directly contrary to this case is that of the Cleveland Col-
umbus and Cincinnati R.R.CO.v.Mara,26 Ohio ST. 185. The evi-
dence in this case showed that Mrs Mlaras injuries were occas-
ioned by her falling or being precipitated,from the steps or
platform of the car into the cattle guards,and there was evi-
dence tending to show that this was causea by a "jerk" or sud-
den start of the train carelessly and wrongfuly permitted by
the officers of the company. Her husband while on the stand
had described the manner of her injury,and that he was a step
or so behind her when the injury occurred,and that he stepped
right to her and a man named Nash came immediately after.
Counsel for plaintiff then asked the following question:
"While you and Nash were in the act of getting your wife out
of the cattle guard,iimmediately after the accidentdid Mr Nash
ask her how she came to be there; did she make answer to it,
and if so what was it?" Witness replied:"Nash asked her how
she came to be thrown in there,and she told him she was jerked
off while in the act of getting off the cars."
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On review the supreme court said: "We think the court erred in
admitting proof of what was said by Mrs 1ara as to the cause
of her fall or precipitation into the ditch of the cattle
guard. Although occurring immodiately after the accident,it
was no part of the res gestae,but a narration of a past trans-
action,and therefore mere hearsay evidence."
It seems impossible to reconcile the two decisions.Certain-
ly applying the test to the latter case which the court ap-
plied in the Brownell casethe evidence would be admissible.
The Ohio court does not discuss the subject at all or give any
basis for its decision,more than is given above. It is an ex-
treme case and not in line with the leading American or Eng-
lish cases. These cases are so similar that they are of spec-
ial interest,as showing the contrariety of doctrine in dif-
ferent courts.
(Insurance Co.,v.Mosley 8 Wall.397.) Was an action on a pol-
icy of insurance. The question was as to whether the deceased,
Mosley came to his death by an accident inflicting personal
injury,or whether he died from disease. To prove that his
death was caused by injury inflicted by accident,his wife and
son testifiedthat he had left his bed in the night,that when
he came back he said he had been hurt,by falling down stairs.
He died a short time thereafter,and his death was supposed to
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have been caused by the accident. The court in review held the
evidence was not admissible as dying declarationsbut held
that they were properly received as part of the res gestae.
Swayne J.in his opinion says: "In the complexity of human af-
fairswhat is done and what is said are often so related that
neither can be detached without leaving the residue fragmen-
tary and distorted. There may be fraud and falsehood in both;
but there is no grolnd of objection to the one that does not
exist equally in the other. To reject the verbal fact would
not unfrequently have the same effect as to strike out the
controling member from a sentence,or the controling sentence
from its context.......... Where sickness of affection is the
principle subject of inquiry,the sickness or affection is the
principle fact. The res gestae are the declarations tending
to show the reality of its existence and its extent and char-
acter. The tendency of recent adjudications is to extend rath-
er than narrow the scope of the doctrine. Rightly guarded in
its practical application thef'e is no principle in the law of
evidence more safe in its results. There is none which rests
on a more solid basis of reason and authority. We think it was
properly applied in the court below. In the ordinary concerns
of life no one would doubt the truth of these declarations,or
15.
hesitate to regard them uncontradicted as concl-sive. Their
probative force would not be questioned. Unlike much other ev-
idence equally cogent for all the p -;rposes of moral convic-
tions,they ha ve the sanction of law as well as reason. The
want of this concurrence in the law islften to be regretted.
The weight of reflection,is increased by the fact that what
w- s said could not be received as "dying declarations,"althougi,
the person who made it was dead,and hence could not be called
as a witness. "In this case as reported there was nothing to
show how long an interval elapsed between the injury and the
declarations. From the circumstances it woald seem to have
been at least five minutes. Though the court speaks of the dec-
laration as being made "very soon after the fall." There was
a strong dissenting opinion in this case by Justice Clifford
concurred in by Justice Nelson,anL the case has been much
criticised. It is quite possible that to meet out abstarct
justice,the court in this case, disregarded or at least undu-
ly strained the general well settled rules of utidence. Howev-
er this may be the case must be regarded as going to one ex-
treme,while Bedingfields case,(14 Cox's Criminal Cses 341.)
goes equaly to the other. Bedingfield was indicted for the
murder of a widow named Buddwith whom he had intimate rela-
tions. He had threatened to cut her throat. She was a laund-
16.
ress,and had,in her business,two women assistants. On tne
morning of her death,the accused came to her house earlier
than usual,and they were together in a room for some time.He
went outand she was found by one of the assistants 2yinig sen-
seless on the floor. He went to a shop,and bought some spir-
its,which he carried back to the room where Mrs Rudd was,both
of the assistants being at the time in the yard. "In a minute
or two the deceased came suddenly out of the house towards the
women with her throat cut,and meeting one of them said some-
thing pointing backwards to the house.In a few moments she was
dead."At the trial the counsel for the prosecution in his open-
ing speech proposed to state to the jury what the deceased
said as she came out of the house;but the Chief Justice pre-
vented him,saying substantially that "he had carefully consid-
ered the question,and was clear that it could not be admitted,
and therefore could not be statedas it might have a fatal ef-
fect. He regretted that according to the law of England,any
statement made by the deceased should not be admissible.Then
could it be admissiblehaving been made in the absence of the
prisoner,as part of the res gestae?It is not so admissible,for
it was not part of anything done,but something said after
something done.It was not as if while being in the room,and
while the act was being done,she had said something. "Later the
17.
counsel attempted to prove what the deceased said;but the
Chief Justice ruled it out,"anything," he said, "uttered by
the deceased at the time the act was being done would be ad-
missible,as for instance,if she had been heard to say some-
thing,as "don't Harry." But here it was something stated by
her after it was all over,wvhatever it was,and after the act
was completed." This case ha ; also been much criticised.
Antecedent Declarations.
Antecedent declarations a-e often admitted as part of the res
gestae. In the celebrated Haydeni case,the prisoner was indict-
ed in Connecticut for the murder of Mary Stannard. The sup-
posed motive being the alleged pregnancy of the deceased,by
Hayden,a married man. The victim was found dead in the woods.
On the hearing evidence was admitted of the declarations of
the deceased,on the day of the murder,that she was pregnant by
liayden,that she had seen him that day,that he had promised to
get her some medicine and to meet her in the woods that day to
let her have it. In Reg. v. Wainright,13 Cox's C.C.17; a murder
case. Lord Chief Justice Cokburn refused to admit evidence of
a declaration of the deceasedon the day she was last seen
alive as. to where she was going. lie said: "It was only a state-
ment of intention which might or might not have been carried
out. She would have gone any way under any circumstance . You
18.
get the fact that on leaving she made a statement,but you must
not go beyond it: In Kirby v. State,7 Yerg.259,an the trial of
an indictment for murder evidence was admitted of the declara-
tions of the deceased on the evening before he was missed,
that he was going to the Pine Mountains,to hunt a saltpetre
cave. The court said: "It is part of the transaction:Explains
the reason why Elrod was in the Pine Mountains and constitu-
tes a fact in the case: This declarationmade as it may be
saidwhile on his way,and explaining the reason of his going,
constitutes an important fact to elucidate the question of his
death. But a declaration, "shortly before his death," that he
had been to the mountairis,and was going out shortly again,was
inadmissible. There 'vas nothing in the evidence admitted tend-
ing to charge the prisoner with the murderbut the mere state-
ment of the deceased. In Hunter v.State,40 U.J.L.495,536,a
man afterwards murderedmade statements to his son,and wrote
a note to his wife,a few hours before leaving home on the .
night of the nurder,to the effect that he was going to the
city of C.on business,and that the prisoner was going with hiUi.
Held that the statements both oral and written were admissible
as explanations and preparations of the act of going from
home. The court taking occasion to say: "The adjudications on
the subject,more especially those in this country,are perplex-
19.
ingly variant. I can readily find judicial rulings by force of
which this testimony would be excluded;but I can as readily
find other rilings of equal weight,that wo-ld sanction its ad-
mission.,, It will at once be seen that this branch of the doc-
trine is very difficult to apply. The admission of such state-
ments being much more dangerous than the admission of subse-
quent or contemporaneous declarations. One so often makes
statements which subsequent events will not justify,though
made :iith the best intentions. The courts are rightly ve.ry
slow in allowing persons to be convicted of crime by anteced-
ent statements not made under the sanctity of an oath,or with
the privilege of a cross examination. The doctrine of the hay-
den trial is an extreme and it wo dd seem dangerous one. No
one saw Hayden and the girl together in the woods. It is pos-
sible she might have maae up her mind to commit suicide and
for some real or fancied wrong desired to charge her death to
Hayden,or might it not be possible she had made an appoint-
ment with Hayden,and failing to meet him,and overcome by the
sense of her shame committcd suicide. I have seen no report oi
the case but what alloyed room for the truth of either of the
above suppositions. Such being the case aught hLumn life to :ja
placed in jeopardy by the admission of such testimony'? In the
case of Wainright,supra,the court f, lly recognizes the uncer-
tainty of antecedent statements for it says: "she might not
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have carried out her intentions. " In the Kirby and Hunter
cases (supr: ) the statement is nade explanatory,or in prepara-
tion for the subsequent act,the act tends to corroborate the
antecedent statement,and the danger in admitting the evidence
is lessened. Lut in the Uayd'.n case there aas no evidence b:lt
the bare statement of the deceased, either that there was an
intended meeting in the woodsor if it had been agreed upon,
that it actualy took place. It is impossible to frame a rule
which aill not rely for its enforcement to some extent on the
discretion of the court.
But would not it insure greater safety to demand before
antecedent declarations are admitted as evidence,that they
should be corroborated by subsequent events. If Hayden and
TMary Stannard had been seen in the woods together at the time
she said they were to be there,although no one saw him commit
the murderwhat a strong corroborative fact it would have
been,and how much credence it would have given to her state-
ment. But some will say,this will defeat the very object for
which antecedent declarations are admitted,e.g.,to supply the
want of better evidence. It would seem that those who argue
thus have mistaken the object of evidence,which is to assist
a jury to arrive at the truth,and thus render a just verdict;
not to secure the conviction of the accused at any hazard.
21.
Any system of jurisprudence which allows a conviction on evi-
dence so unsatisfactory in its nature is at fault. To allow a
statement fortelling the happening of an event,to go to a jury
to prove the event did happen as intended is straining the
legitimate rules of evidence.
Conclusion.
Enough illustrations have been refered to verify the former
statement,of the lack of uniformity in the application of the
principle. The courts uniformily agree that the declaration
and the act must constitute one transaction or at least be so
closely connected that one gains confirmation from the other.
Yet in each case it must be left to the judicial mind to de-
termine,by applying the proper tests,whether in fact in a giv-
en case the two are so closely connected as to constitute one
act or to confirm each other. It has been seen that the prin-
ciple is but a qualification of the rule that "Hearsay is no
evidence" and is received merely as indicitive of the actual
state of mind of the person using them when they were uttered,
or as words or exclamations accompanying an act which is in
issue. What takes declarations constituting res gestae from
the rules governing the admission of hearsay,is the fact of
confirmation and credence they receive from surrounding cir-
cumstances. This leaves much to the discretion of the court.
It is not to be expected that each court will look at the var-
ious questions brought before them in the same light. Some
courts have,apparently,been influenced to extend the doctrine,
because it was a convenient ,,ay to admit evidence inadmissible
as dying declarations,thus possibly rendering abstract justice,
23.
but seriously unsettling th,9 general principles which should
govern.
In many cases however the divergance though marked is not
as great as it seems. Sometimes the res gestae or "main fact"
is an independent circumstance,so distinct and clear cutthat
it is unnecessary to prove any remarks or "surrotunding circum-
stances" to illustrate its character or the motive which promp-
ted it. In such cases it is evident that the surrouding cir-
cumstances would not form an essential element of the main
fact. In other cases the main fact unecplained or qualified
would be of slight value to the court. As where a testator had
destroyed his will,the simple act would not explain whether it
was by accident or intentional. But if he accompanys the act
with a statement as to his purpose or reason these are of
high value to explain the intention of the act. Or the act
may be so closely connected with a long chain of circumstan-
ces which follow or precede it,that it may be almost impossi-
ble to select the res gestae. Such a case was Insurance CO.v.
Mosley,supra. The court holding the res gestae to be not only
the fall but the physical suffering consequent upon it,judg-
ing from R.R.CO. v.1ara,the Ohio courts would have held that
the fall alone constituted the res gestae,and shut out the
subsequent statements.
24.
Statements to be admitted should also be free from any self-
ish,or improrer motive. This although seldom spoken of in the
decisions,undoubtably explains many apparent conflicts. The
statemeent of a person who would be benefitted by changing by a
falsehood the natural inferance which would follow his act,
sufficient time for thought intervening,would naturally have
little weight with a court. Such might be statements of an en-
gineer or conductor of a train which had caused an accident.
On the other hand statements made where nothing could be
gained by sinister motives,though not immediately accompany-
ing the act,are given great weight.
There are dicta in some cases,to the effect that where
the declaration is made to a person who has full knowledge of
the facts which caused the deceased to make the statement,
they would be admissible when not otherwise. As in R.R.CO.,
v.Mara. The husband was not out of sight of the wife when the
injury was received,being near enough to her to have felt the
"jerk" caused by the starting of the train,and being conver-
sant with all the particulars of the accident,could have been
subjected to a cross examination nearly as effective as could
the wife if she had lived. Thus her declaration was merely
corroborative of what the husband could swear to. The court
however did not discuss this point. It is evident that the
25.
element of time is not conclusive if continuity between the
act and the statement be unbroken.
It will be seen that when all means have been exhausted
for reconciling the various casesthe decisions in many in-
stances cannot be brought into harmony. It is owing to the nat
ural difficulties,and varied circumstances surrounding each
case. That this confusion exists is to be regretted. In a
branch of the law of evidence of so much importance,and under
which questions are so constantly arising in practice uniformi-
ty is much to be desired. That complete uniformity will be
brought about is doubtful. That reform may be had is clear.
How shall it be accomplished? In Georgia an attempt is made
to regulate by statute which is as follows. "Declarations ac-
companying an act,or so nearly connected therewith in time as
to be free from all suspicion of devise or after thought,are
admissible in evidence as part of the res gestae., (Code of
Georgia § 3373). But it is evident this does not help the
matter. It merely enacts as a statute a settled principle.
It is in the exercise of their discretion where the courts
differ. It is clear then,any reform must corme from the courts,
not from the legialature. This may be brought about by the
courts stating just what facts control their decision in ad-
mitting or rejecting evidence in each case.
26.
Whether it is lack of confidence in the testirnony;a narrow
idea of what is included in res gestae; the absence of need
for explanatory statements,or a desire to narrow or extend
the general rule. Then we could determine whether there was a
real conflict in the casesor whether what at first appears to
be a conflict was caused by the different manner of looking
at the same facts.
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